Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

 

Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Free Access - Register Here

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Wright, E. F.
Right arrow Articles by Wells, G. L.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
PubMed
Right arrow Articles by Wright, E. F.
Right arrow Articles by Wells, G. L.
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati  
What's this?
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 1, 183-190 (1988)
DOI: 10.1177/0146167288141018

Is the Attitude-Attribution Paradigm Suitable for Investigating the Dispositional Bias?

Edward F. Wright

St. Francis Xavier University

Gary L. Wells

University of Alberta, Edmonton

The attitude-attribution paradigm requires people to read an essay that opposes or favors some issue under conditions in which the author is said to have had choice or no choice regarding the selection of the essay stance. The no-choice conditions are considered critical for revealing the dispositional bias; in these conditions, the extent to which the readers attribute attitudes to the author in line with the essay direction is taken as an index of people's tendencies to be dispositionally biased. We hypothesized that this paradigm overestimates the dispositional bias by leading attributers to believe that their task is to glean attitude information from the essay in spite of the author's lack of choice. Attributions from 192 subjects were obtained using the traditional or a modified version of the attitude-attribution paradigm. One important feature of the modified version was a statement to attributers that some of the information that they were to receive might be irrelevant to the judgments that they would be asked to make. A three-way interaction emerged indicating that the modified version had no effect in the choice conditions but significantly attenuated the dispositional bias in the no-choice conditions. We argued that the dispositional bias, although genuine, is overestimated by the traditional attitude-attribution paradigm.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
Pers Soc Psychol RevHome page
T. M. Holtgraves and Y. Kashima
Language, Meaning, and Social Cognition
Personality and Social Psychology Review, February 1, 2008; 12(1): 73 - 94.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Journal of Language and Social PsychologyHome page
E. R. Igou and H. Bless
The Conversational Basis for the Dilution Effect
Journal of Language and Social Psychology, March 1, 2005; 24(1): 25 - 35.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Pers Soc Psychol BullHome page
I. Choi and R. E. Nisbett
Situational Salience and Cultural Differences in the Correspondence Bias and Actor-Observer Bias
Pers Soc Psychol Bull, September 1, 1998; 24(9): 949 - 960.
[Abstract]