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Agreement Pressure and Opponent Strategies in Oligopoly Bargaining

Lamar University

Previous research has shown the softest strategy to be superior to tougher strategies in oligopoly bargaining. However, initial offer and subsequent strategy were confounded in previous research. Female students from introductory psychology classes played the role of buyers and bargained with programmed seller strategies under high or low agreement pressure. Subjects were afforded the opportunity to bargain with the strategy (seller) of their choice and to change sellers as they wished. As hypothesized, (a) high agreement pressure reduced the total amount of bargaining but produced more profit for the seller; (b) the soft initial strategy was more effective than the tough initial strategy; and (c) the advantage of the soft initial strategy was more pronounced under high agreement pressure. These results suggest that in oligopoly bargaining first impressions created by initial bargaining strategies have important consequences, especially under pressures to reach agreement quickly.

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