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Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 19, No. 2, 158-166 (1993)
DOI: 10.1177/0146167293192004
© 1993 Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

Relation of Conditional Reasoning to Heuristic Processing

Ben R. Slugoski

Mount Allison University

Heather A. Shields

Mount Allison University

Kim A. Dawson

Mount Allison University

Wyer and Srull have proposed that a tendency to treat conditional relationships between events as if they were biconditional underlies a number of familiar biases in human social judgment. This hypothesis was tested in a factor-analytic study in which 111 subjects completed seven measures of heuristic use and three measures of conditional reasoning. A principal components analysis of the measures revealed two main factors, corresponding to an availability dimension and a representativeness dimension. There was no evidence for the hypothesis that the disposition to infer "Y is X" given "X is Y" underlies either dimension, although one measure of conditional reasoning, Wason's selection task, was related to both. This result is discussed in terms of Evans's two-stage (heuristic/analytic processing) model of reasoning.


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