Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

 

Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Free Access - Register Here

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Right arrow Citation Map
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Denes-Raj, V.
Right arrow Articles by Cole, J.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
PubMed
Right arrow Articles by Denes-Raj, V.
Right arrow Articles by Cole, J.
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati  
What's this?
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 21, No. 10, 1083-1092 (1995)
DOI: 10.1177/01461672952110009

The Generality of the Ratio-Bias Phenomenon

Veronika Denes-Raj

University of Massachusetts at Amherst

Seymour Epstein

University of Massachusetts at Amherst

Jonathan Cole

University of Massachusetts at Amherst

A well-substantiated, surprising finding is that people judge the occurrence of an event of low probability as less likely when its probability is represented by a ratio of smaller (e.g., I in 20) than of larger (e.g., 10 in 200) numbers. The results of three experiments demonstrated that the phenomenon is broadly general and occurs as readily in pre-as in post outcome judgments. These results support an interpretation in terms of subjective probability, as suggested by the principles of cognitive-experiential self theory, but not an interpretation in terms of imagining counter-factual alternatives, as proposed by norm theory.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
Med Decis MakingHome page
C. L. Cuite, N. D. Weinstein, K. Emmons, and G. Colditz
A Test of Numeric Formats for Communicating Risk Probabilities
Med Decis Making, June 1, 2008; 28(3): 377 - 384.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Med Decis MakingHome page
I. M. Lipkus
Numeric, Verbal, and Visual Formats of Conveying Health Risks: Suggested Best Practices and Future Recommendations
Med Decis Making, October 1, 2007; 27(5): 696 - 713.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
J. Am. Med. Inform. Assoc.Home page
J. S. Ancker, Y. Senathirajah, R. Kukafka, and J. B. Starren
Design Features of Graphs in Health Risk Communication: A Systematic Review
J. Am. Med. Inform. Assoc., November 1, 2006; 13(6): 608 - 618.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


Home page
Pers Soc Psychol BullHome page
S. Epstein, S. Donovan, and V. Denes-Raj
The Missing Link in the Paradox of the Linda Conjunction Problem: Beyond Knowing and Thinking of the Conjunction Rule, the Intrinsic Appeal of Heuristic Processing
Pers Soc Psychol Bull, February 1, 1999; 25(2): 204 - 214.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
J Natl Cancer Inst MonogrHome page
I. M. Lipkus and J. G. Hollands
The Visual Communication of Risk
J Natl Cancer Inst Monographs, January 1, 1999; 1999(25): 149 - 163.
[Abstract] [Full Text]