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When an Adversary is Caught Telling the Truth: Reciprocal Cooperation Versus Self-Interest in Distributive Bargaining

University of Missouri, St. Louis, paul.paese{at}umsl.edu

Debra A. Gilin

University of Missouri, St. Louis

In the present research, the authors examined a distributive bargaining situation in which the participant’s counterpart either did or did not make an unambiguously cooperative move at the outset of the negotiation. Participants’ bargaining roles were written such that they had a clear alternative of their own as well as accurate inside information about the other party’s no-agreement alternative. A confederate posing as a participant assumed the opposite role and followed a script. The script was varied such that the confederate either did or did not disclose his or her alternative at the outset of the negotiation. Results indicated that even though cooperation ran counter to their self-interest, participants were more cooperative in the disclosure conditions. That is, they made less demanding offers, disclosed more truthful information, and settled for less profit. Implications of these results and future research directions are discussed.

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