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Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
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Incremental Commitment and Reciprocity in a Real-Time Public Goods Game

Robert Kurzban

University of Arizona, rkurzban{at}ucla.edu

Kevin McCabe

University of Arizona

Vernon L. Smith

University of Arizona

Bart J. Wilson

University of Arizona

Allowing players in public goods games to make small incremental commitments to contributing to the good might facilitate cooperation because it helps to prevent players from being "free ridden," contributing more to the public good than other group members. Two experiments using a real-time version of the voluntary contribution mechanism were conducted to investigate the hypothesis that players are generally willing to contribute public goods conditional on beliefs that others are doing so at similar levels. Experiment 1 provided evidence that affording a strategy of commitment can increase the production of public goods. Experiment 2 provided evidence that most players are willing to contribute to the public good at a level at or slightly above the contribution of the lowest contributor in the group. Both experiments point to inequity aversion as an important element of play in public goods games.

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 12, 1662-1673 (2001)
DOI: 10.1177/01461672012712009
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