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Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 29, No. 2, 237-247 (2003)
DOI: 10.1177/0146167202239049
© 2003 Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

The Excluded Player in Coalition Formation

Ilja van Beest

Leiden University and University of Amsterdam

Henk Wilke

Eric van Dijk

Leiden University

Coalition research generally assumes that people strive to maximize their share of the coalition payoff and that they exclude others from joining a coalition if these others are not needed to obtain the coalition payoff. In two experiments, the authors show that this view is too narrow and that willingness to include such others is dependent on the extent to which people feel that exclusion affects the payoff of the excluded player. This finding was moderated by social value orientations. Proselfs were not affected by the consequences for the excluded players. Prosocials were less willing to exclude others the more harmful were the consequences of exclusion. Results are related to research on social exclusion, the do-no-harm principle, and social value orientations.

Key Words: coalition formation • social exclusion • the do-no-harm principle • social value orientations


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