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Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 31, No. 7, 889-901 (2005)
DOI: 10.1177/0146167204274094

Attributional Inference Across Cultures: Similar Automatic Attributions and Different Controlled Corrections

Matthew D. Lieberman

University of California-Los Angeles, lieber{at}ucla.edu

Johanna M. Jarcho

University of California-Los Angeles

Junko Obayashi

University of California-Los Angeles

Five studies examined the automatic and controlled components of attributional inference in U.S. and East Asian (EA) samples. Studies 1 through 3 used variations of the "anxious woman" paradigm, manipulating the inferential goal (dispositional or situational) and the normative impact of situational constraint information (discounting or augmenting). In each study, U.S. and EA participants under cognitive load produced strong automatic attributions to the focus of their inferential goal (dispositional or situational). Compared with the U.S. cognitive load participants, U.S. no load participants corrected their attributions according to the normative rules of inference. In contrast, EA no load participants corrected in the direction of situational causality, even when the specific content of the situational information provided should have promoted stronger dispositional inferences. Studies 4 and 5 examined and ruled out alternative accounts. Results are discussed in terms of a situational causality heuristic present in EA individuals.

Key Words: attribution • culture • automaticity • control


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