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Nice Guys Finish First: The Competitive Altruism Hypothesis

Charlie L. Hardy

Mark Van Vugt

University of Kent at Canterbury

Three experimental studies examined the relationship between altruistic behavior and the emergence of status hierarchies within groups. In each study, group members were confronted with a social dilemma in which they could either benefit themselves or their group. Study 1 revealed that in a reputation environment when contributions were public, people were more altruistic. In both Studies 1 and 2, the most altruistic members gained the highest status in their group and were most frequently preferred as cooperative interaction partners. Study 3 showed that as the costs of altruism increase, the status rewards also increase. These results support the premise at the heart of competitive altruism: Individuals may behave altruistically for reputation reasons because selective benefits (associated with status) accrue to the generous.

Key Words: altruism • status • reputation • public goods • costly signals

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 32, No. 10, 1402-1413 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/0146167206291006
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