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Threat Capacity and the Choice between Independence and Interdependence

James M. Gleason

State University of New York at Buffalo

Borah's (1963) version of the Deutsch and Krauss (1960) trucking game was employed under three experimental conditions-no gates, bilateral gates, and bilateral gates plus a capacity for threatening to fine the other for gate use. The original finding, that presence of the gates interferes with cooperation, was replicated. Introduction of the threat capacity caused cooperation to increase, suggesting that the likelihood of reaching agreement is enhanced when two people can threaten to punish one another for taking independent, as opposed to interdependent, action.

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 2, 252-255 (1978)
DOI: 10.1177/014616727800400216


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