Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

 

Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Click here for more information

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Upshawl, H. S.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
PubMed
Right arrow Articles by Upshawl, H. S.
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati  
What's this?
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 2, 182-185 (1979)
DOI: 10.1177/014616727900500211
© 1979 Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

Attitude toward the Reasons for One's Actions: A Determinant of Perceived Freedom

Harry S. Upshawl

Department of Psychology, Box 4348, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, Chicago, Illinois, 60680

The attitude of an actor toward the reasons for an action has been defended by Dworkin as the basis of freedom of action. This study tested the hypothesis that this consideration contributes to the perception of freedom by laymen. 18 items that described intentional actions were rated by 72 students along four dimensions: the actor's freedom of action, the valence of the actor's alternatives, the difference in valence of alternatives, and the actor's attitude toward the reason for his or her chosen action. Scale values for perceived freedom were correlated with scale values for the other three dimensions. The attitude variable, alone, significantly predicted perceived freedom, and it added significantly to prediction based on the other two variables. Dworkin's conception holds that the reason for an action is logically prior to a judgment of freedom. Some other conceptions imply that perceived freedom is a determinant of causal attribution.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati    What's this?