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Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
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Heider's Formulation of Social Perception and Attributional Processes

Toward Further Clarification

Gifford Weary

Ohio State University

Marvina C. Rich

Northwestern University

John H. Harvey

Vanderbilt University

William J. Ickes

University of Missouri-St. Louis

It is argued that Heider's conception of the relationship between perceptual and attributional processes has not received sufficient attention. The distinction between the phenomenal description of perception and Heider's causal analysis of the perceptual process is presented. It is noted that Heider's attribution theory may best be viewed as a comprehensive formulation of the naive, implicit principles that underlie the perception of social objects and that his emphasis is on an underlying flow, a causal stream from the distal stimulus to the final percept, rather than only on subprocesses such as the phenomenology of the perceiver.

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 6, No. 1, 37-43 (1980)
DOI: 10.1177/014616728061005
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