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Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 7, No. 3, 459-466 (1981)
DOI: 10.1177/014616728173015
© 1981 Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

Outcome Severity and Knowledge of "Ought"

Effects on Moral Evaluations

Michael D. Harvey

University of Alberta

Two experiments were designed to test the hypothesis that moral evaluations of retaliatory harm are a direct function of the discrepancy between the observed retaliation severity and the appropriate retaliation severity (the Ought). Both severe and mild retaliation, then, would be evaluated more negatively than moderate retaliation. The first experiment manipulated the value of the Ought, and the second experiment allowed subjects to employ their own belief about it. The results of both experiments supported the hypothesis.


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